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Rural industry has made an extraordinary contribution to China’s rapid economic growth 
over the past 20 years, though the sector’s recent performance was beginning to wane in the mid-
1990s.  The contribution of rural firms to national gross industrial output rose from about 10 
percent in 1979 to nearly 40 percent in 1996, increasing at an average annual rate of nearly 20 
percent during the 1980s.
2  The sector created more than 5 million new jobs annually between 
1978 and 1996.  Despite this record, rural industry’s performance since the mid-1990s has raised 
concerns over the sector’s future economic health and long-term sustainability.
3  Township and 
Village Enterprise (TVE) expansion appeared to have reached a turning point in 1997 when the 
total number of firms and overall employment declined for the first time.
4   Some believed that 
the downturn might signal the beginning of the end for China’s experiment with rural 
industrialization.
5 
Instead of withering away, however, a new type of firm has emerged in rural China with 
remarkable rapidity.  Since the mid-1990s, China’s rural industrial sector has quietly experienced 
a surge of privatizations.  Using national statistics, Oi estimates that local leaders had “privatized” 
more than half a million firms by the mid- to late-1990s.
6  Kung demonstrates that even in 
southern Jiangsu, the birthplace of the collective rural firm, more than half of the villages had 
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  1 started to privatize their firms by the mid-1990s.
7  In her case studies of communities in 
Songjiang County of Shanghai, Whiting finds that 15 percent of the local TVEs had been 
privatized by 1996.
8  According to our recent survey of 670 firms in 15 counties in China’s 
Lower Yangtse Delta region, more than half of the enterprises that were formerly owned by 
township governments, i.e., Township Enterprises (TEs), had been partially or completely 
privatized by the summer of 2000.
9  And, according to our interviews, the privatization process is 
not over.  Leaders repeatedly told us that they have plans to continue privatization.
10  If these 
rates are representative of the rest of China, then literally more than a million firms in rural China 
were privatized by 2000.  According to the literature, this number of firms is many-fold greater 
than the total number of privatizations that have occurred during 1990s in the entire rest of the 
world combined.   
Besides the magnitude of privatization, two other features are unique to the ownership 
transformation of China’s rural industries.  First, China is almost the only country in the world in 
which the most commonly practiced form of privatization is insider privatization.  In the rest of 
the world privatization largely has been part of a process by which ownership and control of the 
firm is transferred to a group of outsiders (that is, individuals that were not working in or 
managing the firm prior to privatization).
11 In China, however, township leaders almost always 
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  2 sell their firms to insiders, specifically, the managers of the firm.
12  Second, relative to the rest of 
the world, in which it is not surprising to find that most privatized firms have failed, many 
privatized firms in China—though not all—appear to be experiencing a rise in performance.
13   
The overall goal of our paper is to closely examine some of the trends and to investigate 
the peculiarities unique to rural China’s privatization movement.  In short, we seek to address 
some of the unanswered questions and unresolved debates about a.) the extent of rural China’s 
industrial privatization, b.) the process of that privatization, and c.) its impact on firm efficiency.  
To meet these goals, we use our own data set to describe the scope of rural China’s privatization 
movement.  Since TVEs have been so important to China’s growth in the past, documenting such 
a dramatic change will be important for both academia and policy makers interested in 
understanding the role these firms may play in China’s future growth.  Second, based on both our 
data and extensive interviews in rural China between 1996 and 2000, we describe in detail the 
process by which China’s rural communities have privatized their firms, often in ways that are 
unique among privatization movements across the world.  Finally, we demonstrate how this 
process in part is contributing to a privatization movement that is improving the efficiency of 
many, though not all, firms in rural China.  In the final section of the paper, we also speculate on 
the potential effects that privatization may have on the political economy of the rural community, 
beyond the performance of the firms themselves.  
Our paper has a number of unique contributions that strengthen the literature on rural 
industrialization.  First, it is based on a comprehensive set of primary data that we collected in 
1998 and 2000.   Our study helps put previous work into perspective and allows us to 
demonstrate that privatization differs significantly over time and across space, even within our 
                                                 
12 James Kung, “The evolution of property rights in village enterprises;” Jean Oi, “The decades of rural 
reform in China: an overview and assessment;” Susan Whiting, “Power and Wealth in Rural China: The 
Political Economy of Institutional Change.”   
13 The record of insider privatization on improving performance in Russia, Central and Eastern European 
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  3 two sample provinces, Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
14  Second, our paper also is the first to study how 
privatization affects the performance of firms.  Extant literature on TVE privatization has focused 
mostly on identifying determinants.  For example, Whiting identifies ideological constraints that 
explain why some communities privatize their firms and others do not.
15  Kung and Whiting find 
that market competition matters in determining the pace of privatization.
16  Other works are more 
specific.  Kung and Lin, for example, find that when the competitive pressures reduce the 
profitability of firms, which in turn reduce fiscal revenues, leaders tend to privatize.
17  Li and his 
coauthors demonstrate the linkages between reforms in the rural banking sector and enterprise 
privatization.
18  While understanding the determinants of privatization is absolutely critical to our 
understanding of this new development, almost no previous work has examined the effect of 
privatization on firm performance. 
Our paper, however, has several limitations.  First, the data was collected in only two 
coastal provinces.  As a result, we need to be careful in drawing inferences about the TVE sector 
in other parts of China.  Second, most of the data were collected in the summer of 1998, although 
they were supplemented with additional information from a 2000 resurvey of most of the 
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  4 localities and firms in our sample.  Given the pace of change in rural China, it is possible that 
more changes may have occurred since 2000.  Third, we are studying primarily the process of 
privatization and how this process has affected the efficiency of firms.  Although in the final 
section of the paper we discuss a number of implications for the local political economy, in 
addition to the direct efficiency effects – for example, such issues as the effect of privatization on 
the community’s fiscal condition or local governance – these issues are peripheral in this paper.   
 
Data 
The data are from surveys we conducted in 1998 and 2000.  In interviews during both 
years, we asked retrospective questions to elicit information from managers and leader about all 
ownership changes between 1993 and 1999.  The main survey concentrates on TEs and private 
firms, focuses on the period from 1993 to 1999, and covers rural industrial activity in Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang Provinces, two of China’s most developed coastal provinces, one north of Shanghai and 
the other south.  In the first phase of the data collection, we carried out a census, or complete 
enumeration, of 643 TEs that operated in each of the sample townships in 1993.  In the rest of the 
paper, we call this the township census.  On average, each township had 11 TEs in 1993, ranging 
from one township that owned and operated 20 firms to one township that only had 2.
19 
Although we collected a large amount of data on the 643 firms during the 1998 survey, 
we discovered that we were missing certain key pieces of information.  To supplement our 
original data, and to update the information on ownership changes between 1998 and 2000, we 
conducted a second round survey on a subset of 43 townships and 390 firms in 2000.  To make 
our presentation succinct, we use the smaller census of 390 firms in the rest of the paper, but our 
main arguments also hold for the larger but shorter township census data.  For all of the firms 
included in the township census, we include information on any changes that occurred in 
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output was 13.9 million yuan, and average total fixed assets were 25.3 million yuan. 
  5 ownership between 1993 and 1999.   These changes include outright privatization of firms, as 
well as conversions to joint-stock or shareholding companies, changes that give partial ownership 
rights to individuals.  We also collected basic social-economic information on each township.  In 
addition, we conducted in-depth interviews with at least two township leaders in each sample 
township.  During these interviews, we asked them about their involvement in the firms and 
elicited information about themselves; for example, their level of education, age, and job history.  
Table A1 provides statistics that summarize some of the key variables included in the 1998 and 
2000 township censuses.   
One of the most important sets of variables in the township census include information 
about each firm’s ownership status.  Changes in ownership took several forms.  Depending on the 
definition, firms are classified as township or privatized.  When using a share-shifting definition, 
a township enterprise includes only those firms with 100 percent controlling interests held by the 
township, and a privatized enterprise includes those with any shares shifted to private individuals.  
According to the controlling-interest shifting categorization, a privatized enterprise is a firm in 
which the township has shifted a majority of the shares to private individuals.  The most 
restrictive definition, complete privatization, implies that a privatized enterprise is any firm with 
all shares shifted to private individuals. 
To get more detailed firm-level data, we also conducted a second part of our survey in 
1998.  In the rest of the paper this is called the firm-level data set.  To choose the firms, we 
randomly sampled three firms in each township from a pool of all the township-owned and 
private firms.  All of the township enterprises in the firm-level data set are also included in the 
township census, although firms had to meet minimum size criteria.
20  In total, the firm-level data 
set included information on 168 firms.  Thirty-three out of the 168 firms were established 
originally as private firms (henceforth private firms), and the government initially owned 135 in 
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  6 1993.  Private firms were included in the sample to allow us to judge how well privatized firms 
do relative to private ones.
21   
The survey instrument used to collect the firm-level data included two main parts.  
Enumerators conducted a sit-down survey with the firm manager or owner.  The manager survey 
elicited detailed information on firm ownership during the survey period, the privatization 
process (including how firms were evaluated and the price paid by the buyer), and on the buyout 
negotiations during which the price was established.  We also asked the manager about the other 
rights that they had with regard to the firm, questions on corporate governance, information about 
the firm’s production and marketing activities, and the manager’s human capital attributes.  The 
firm’s accounting department provided data on the firm’s financial and cost accounting records. 
One of the most important goals of the survey was to collect reliable measures of the 
firm’s performance.  In order to do this, we recorded detailed information from the firm’s income 
statements and balance sheets.  In this paper, we focus on four effort and performance measures: 
a.) the manager’s weekly workload; b.) the firm’s accumulated overdue accounts receivable rate 
(in other words, a measure of the amount of bad debt that it holds in the form of overdue accounts 
receivable); c.) the firm’s profit rate; and d.) the amount of value added to the production process 
per worker.  The manager’s weekly workload is the number of hours the manager works per 
week.  The profit rate, defined as a profit-to-sales ratio, measures how well firms are reducing 
costs and generating profits.  We use labor productivity to directly measure firm’s performance in 
terms of value added per worker.
22 
 To create a good measure of accounts receivable management, we start with the overdue 
accounts receivable rate, which is defined as a ratio of accumulated overdue accounts receivable 
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  7 to total assets. We then turn this variable into a “positive” measure of performance, called 
accounts receivable management, a new variable that is defined as (1 – overdue accounts 
receivable rate).  We argue that the way a firm manages its account receivables provides a 
measure of managerial behavior since unpaid accounts tend to accumulate in firms whose 
managers have poor incentives to collect overdue accounts.  For example, in firms in which 
managers or salespersons sell products for personal rebates (or kickbacks) instead of increasing 
the firm’s income, overdue accounts could easily accumulate. Even worse, managers sometimes 
divert cash by providing trade credit to other firms that are owned by their relatives or friends.  At 
the very least, managers with poor incentives are not willing to rigorously collect overdue 
account receivables. 
 
Privatization of Township Enterprises 
Starting from the mid-1990’s, rural China has experienced rapid privatization.  All 
townships in our sample have experienced privatization, and some townships had sold all their 
firms to private owners by 1999.  Although widespread, privatization is a decentralized process 
with most decisions made at the township level.  According to our 1998 interview of township 
leaders, only 34 percent reported that there were county level policies regarding privatization. 
The rest developed their own privatization policies or had no policies at all.  Out of the 88 
privatized firms from our firm-level data, for which we have detailed information, township 
leaders made the privatization decisions in 81 of them.  County leaders made the privatization 
decisions in only seven cases.   
The proportion of firms undergoing privatization is striking (Table 1).  Using the share-
shifting definition, the broadest measure of privatization, 86 percent of sampled firms 
experienced full or partial privatization (column 1).  Although the proportion of privatized firms 
                                                                                                                                                 
worker as the value added to worker ratio, and deflate all years to the 1994 price level.  In estimating the 
production functions later, we use the log of value added per worker as the dependent variable.   
  8 grows progressively less as the privatization definition becomes more restrictive, even if we 
consider only those firms that shifted from government-owned to 100 percent private ownership, 
it is still the case that 57 percent of the firms were privatized.   
The pace of privatization over the seven years covered by our data set in the 1990s also 
accelerated.  There is a marked increase over time in the rate of privatization activity between 
1993 and 1998.  In 1993, leaders only privatized eight percent of the firms.  During 1997 and 
1998, in contrast, local governments privatized 30 percent of the existing township enterprises.  
At some point, of course, as government-owned TEs disappear, the rate of privatization will fall.   
Our data illustrate that townships differ in their rates of privatization (Table 2).  When 
examining our sample townships from 1999, we find striking differences in the rate at which 
leaders have privatized their TEs.  On one hand, there are seven townships just beginning 
privatization in 1999 (row 1).  On the other hand, eight other townships had completely or nearly 
finished privatization by 1999 (row 5).  The different rates of privatization cross-township 
suggest that the privatization decisions are, indeed, mostly made at the township level.   
Our field interviews supported the finding that different localities proceeded with 
privatization at different rates.  For example, in Ning County in the Ningbo area of Zhejiang 
Province, three out of the county’s four townships had finished privatization by the time we 
conducted the first round survey in 1998.  The county, however, did not sell off its first TE, an 
apparel factory, until 1993.  Leaders viewed the initial privatization as an experiment.  After two 
years, the apparel factory turned from a money-losing operation into a profitable and growing 
firm.  The leadership in the county and its townships decided to proceed with privatization in late 
1995.  By the time we visited the county in the 1998, leaders had sold off almost all of the TEs.   
In contrast, Jiangyin County in the Wuxi area of Southern Jiangsu Province privatized 
later.  Leaders had only begun privatizing TEs in one of the four townships that we visited in 
1998.  When we talked to the Yuecheng township party secretary, he explained why he opposed 
privatization.   
  9  
Yes, our TVEs are facing some difficulties now, but they have contributed a lot to our 
local economy in the past.  We cannot let them go only because they are facing 
temporary difficulties.  I believe that when the market becomes better, they will continue 
to contribute to our local economy.  Also, I believe that most privatizations in other 




 However, even when resistance is strong, such as in Jiangyin County, when the 
privatization begins, it proceeds rapidly.  In the summer of 2000, when we revisited Yuecheng 
Township, leaders had sold off nearly 40 percent of the locality’s TEs.  The new township 
secretary had visited Shandong and Zhejiang provinces, and became convinced of the need for 
privatization.  Although we do not have any formal information since 2000, the new secretary 
told us that they plan to sell all township firms by 2002.   
In summary, our interviews and data suggest that rural China has experienced a massive 
privatization movement in the mid-1990s.  The shift in ownership shares and firm ownership 
forms show that privatization is fundamental and wide spread.  Although all townships are 
involved in this privatization movement, they differ in the degree and speed of privatization.  The 
decentralized decision-making and different degree of privatization confirm the observations of 
Whiting who described in her work the spontaneity of privatization reforms and flexibility of 
institutional change in rural China.
24 
 
Insider Privatization, Buyout price and Incentives 
                                                 
23 Township leader interview 73, 23 July 1998. 
24 Susan Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change. 
  10 Privatization in China has not only proceeded at a different pace than in other countries, 
but the process itself is unique.  First, insiders buy most firms, and second, complex methods are 
used to value them.  Understanding the way firms are privatized also is important to measuring 
the effect of privatization on firm performance.   
One of the most important features of privatization, rural China-style, is that most firms 
are sold to insiders, especially to managers.
25  According to our firm-level data, in 92 percent 
privatization cases, leaders sold the firms to insiders.  In a typical case, the original manager and 
other employees bought out the firm completely or partially.  Managers of the firms increased 
their personal shares the most, owning by far the largest part of the privately held shares (nearly 
70 percent).  In only seven cases did outsiders buy the firm.  We revisited these cases in 2000.  
We discovered that in all seven cases, the new “outside” owner had been the only person bidding 
to purchase the firms.  Moreover, when we examined their connections to the townships in which 
they purchased the new firms, we found that in almost all cases, so-called outsiders were closely 
connected to the locality.  Although new buyers were not managers or employees, they all knew a 
great deal about the firm.  In one case, a wealthy relative of a former manager bought the firm 
and retained the manager to run day-to-day operations.  In another case, the owner of a firm with 
a history of collaboration with the TE bought it in what the new owner described to us as a 
“friendly” buyout.  Hence, even in the cases of sales to “outsiders,” the distances between the 
officials that oversaw the former TEs, the original managers, and the new owners were rarely 
arms-length.   
 
Evaluation and the Buyout Price.  The striking difference between China and the rest of 
the world in terms of who bought the firms raise questions about why insider privatization is so 
prevalent.  Kung argues that managers develop firm-specific human capital that is difficult to 
                                                 
25 Kung also finds that the villages in his sample most frequently sold village enterprises to insider 
managers. See James Kung, “The evolution of property rights in village enterprises.” 
  11 transfer to other individuals.  As a result, the firm is more valuable to the existing owner, making 
him the most likely candidate to purchase it.
26  We agree.  We believe, however, that an 
understanding of the exact nature of the privatization process (something that Kung does not 
describe in detail) illustrates why the original manager is most likely to become the new owner, 
and why the process is so difficult to execute.   
While there is not a legally mandated, nation-wide privatization process, many localities 
followed a similar procedure.  Top township leaders usually initiate the privatization process 
(which according to our interview is almost always the party secretary).  The local leader decides 
both which firms to privatize and when to privatize them.  In step one of the privatization process, 
the government leaders organize an evaluation team.  Out of the 88 privatized firms in our firm-
level sample, 85 went through the evaluation process.  Township governments themselves carried 
out most evaluations (54 percent).  County governments conducted others (13 percent), or an 
independent Certified Public Accountant (CPA) firm (33 percent). 
One of the key tasks of the evaluation team is to assess the value of the firm’s assets and 
debts.  Asset evaluations typically are based on the firm’s book value; that is, estimated market 
value of tangible assets (which disregards intangible assets such as brand name or human capital). 
Ninety-three percent of the firm’s debt load, which is usually held by banks (48 percent) or other 
firms (24 percent), ends up being borne by the privatized firm.  After enumerating both the firm’s 
asset and debt values, the evaluation team then set the firm’s equity value – the difference 
between the value of its asset and debt.  We define this as the firm’s base value.   
Interviews with those involved in the buyout process clearly show the importance and 
pervasiveness of the evaluation process.  One new owner of a privatized firm recalls: 
 
 I was really nervous about the level of the value that the company [an independent CPA] 
would attach to my firm.  These guys did not know my business.  They kept telling me 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
  12 that they were only interested in counting up the value of the building, equipment and 
land.  They also spent a lot of time going over the debt load of the firm.  Several people 
spent more than two weeks in my office.  In the end, they produced a long list of the 
firm’s assets and debts.  I was pleased to see that in most cases their valuations were fair.  
We argued a bit over some of the items, but in the end, I had to sign a statement that I 
believed the list was fair.  In fact, I do.
27 
 
Step two involves negotiations over the firm’s buyout price.  During the negotiations, 
leaders and managers start at the firm’s base value and attempt to come to a consensus about its 
future profitability.  As might be expected, there is a lot of uncertainty over the firm’s future 
earnings capabilities.  Successful negotiations make adjustments to the firm’s base value and put 
forward a purchase price.  In this paper, we call this the buyout price.   
While the privatization procedure is fairly similar within and across regions, buyout 
prices vary sharply (Table 3).  Dividing privatized firms into groups and ranking them by the 
ratio of the buyout price to its base value (a ratio that we call the BB ratio) allows for the analysis 
of the privatization process.  At one extreme, twenty firms have a BB ratio close to zero (9 of 
them are zero—row 1).  In this case, although there is a positive base value (that is, the book 
value of the firm’s assets exceeds the value of its debt), leaders required managers to pay only a 
small or zero buyout price.  At the other extreme, seven firms have a negative BB ratio (row 6).  
In these cases, the new owners paid the government a positive buyout price for their firms, even 
though the evaluation showed that the firm had a negative base value (that is, the value of the 
firm’s debts exceeds its assets).  There are also 20 firms that have a BB ratio exceeding one 
(which means that the managers paid a buyout price that was greater than the firms assessed base 
value).  The rest of the firms had a BB ratio between zero and one.   
                                                 
27 Manager interview 3301, July 14. 
  13 Beyond being useful for our analysis of firm performance (next section), the differences 
in the size of the buyout price relative to the assessed base value of the TE should be of interest to 
those concerned about the real objective of privatization.  Top leaders and outsiders have worried 
about the danger that insider privatization would invariably lead to corruption and managers who 
can grossly underpay for their firms.
28  Although it is true that some buyers paid a low buyout 
price for firms, our data illustrate that at least in the case of some firms, the buyer paid a buyout 
price that exceeded the best ex ante estimates of a firm’s base value. 
By examining the premium (or discount) rates paid by managers for their firms, we can 
even more clearly illustrate that in some cases the manager-cum-buyer bought the firm for a steep 
discount, while in other cases, they paid a price well in excess of the firm’s book value (Table 3, 
column 6).  To measure the premium, we set it equal to the buyout price minus the book value (if 
it is positive, the firm pays a premium; if negative, the firm receives a discount).  To account for 
the size of the premium relative to the size of the firm, we create a normalized measure, the 
premium rate, by dividing the premium by the book value of firm’s assets.  In the case of 32 out 
of the 88 privatized firms, buyers purchased firms that were heavily discounted (with a premium 
rate smaller than -0.2); 26 firms were moderately discounted (with a premium rate between -0.2 
and 0); and 30 firms paid a premium (henceforth premium-paying firms). 
 
Insider Privatization with a Tail.  One of the main problems of insider privatization in 
transition economies is that the leaders are at an informational disadvantage vis-a-vis the manager 
during the negotiation process.
29  The leaders typically do not know how efficient a firm will 
become after ownership is transferred to its manager.  Because of this, it is difficult to come up 
with a buyout price that reflects the true long-run earnings potential of the firm.  
                                                 
28 Wen Lu, “Problems during the process of TVE reforms;” People’s Bank of China, Jiaxing Branch, “How 
TVE reforms affect their bank loans?” PBC Research Documents, 1998; Feixiang Sun, “Asset managing in 
the process of TVE reform.” 
29 Hongbin Li, “Reversing privatization as a screening mechanism.”  
  14 In China’s rural areas, leaders face similar information difficulties.
30  The township 
governments usually own multiple firms.  The sample median is 12 firms per township.  With so 
many firms, it is unlikely that leaders know each one well.  Each firm may sell its products to 
markets in many localities.  The typical firm in our sample sells its products to buyers in four 
different counties.  Leaders may not always know where these markets are located or who the 
firm’s customers are.  Township leaders are also frequently rotated from one township posting to 
the next.  In our sample, leaders switched posts on average every 3 years.   
In contrast, the manager knows his own firm well.  He is typically only running one firm 
and has been managing it, or at least working in it, for many years.  The typical new owner of a 
privatized firm prior had been the manager for five years and an employee for 12.  With such 
experience, it is almost certain that the manager better understands the firm’s future profit-earning 
potential and has a more informed basis for knowing how much effort will be needed to 
overcome any serious inefficiencies.  In summary, in the case of China’s rural enterprises, the 
main point here is that managers apparently have a more accurate assessment of the true value of 
firms than leaders when privatization deals are negotiated.  
The question that naturally arises when considering the wide variations in the premium 
rate and the asymmetric nature of information (between leaders and managers) is how are leaders 
able to value their firms.  As we noted above, evaluations can only provide an assessment of the 
firm’s book value.  Evaluations are not able, and in fact do not try, to determine the true market 
value of the firms.  The market value of the firm, always difficult to gauge in a market economy 
like the United States (where it is typically done by the stock market), is even more so in a 
transition economy such as China since there are neither good capital markets nor standard 
accounting practices.  The buyout price, as discussed above, is actually determined during intense 
negotiations between government leaders and firm managers.   
                                                 
30 See Louis Putterman, “On the past and future of China's Township and Village-Owned Enterprises,” 
World Development, Vol. 25 (1997), pp. 1639-1655; James Kung and Yi-min Lin, “The evolving 
  15 Comments by the party secretary of Liuqiao Township in Tongzhou City, Jiangsu 
Province, illustrate the nature of the problem.  
 
It is very difficult to know the exact value of a firm.  What we do is as follows.   Take the 
electric fan firm we sold in 1995, for example. Three brothers run the firm, two of whom 
have college degrees.  They are very capable of doing business.   The book value was 1.6 
million yuan.  But, we knew it was worth more than that because they seemed to be doing 
very well.  All we could do is to get an accountant to evaluate the book value.  This was 
not disputed by us or them.  Beyond the book value, we have to make some guesses and 
there is no objective way of evaluation.  Of course the brothers knew the value better than 
we did.  But, they would never tell us.  So, we talked to one of the brothers and asked for 
2.2 million yuan.  We thought that he would bargain with us.  A little surprisingly, he 
accepted the price.  His only condition was that if they paid the higher price, the firm 
would be completely theirs.  We agreed.  For other firms that we sold, the bargaining 
could last much longer.  For example, our construction material factory had a book value 
of half a million.  We asked the guy who had been running it for exactly half a million.  
The manager refused to pay anything at the beginning.  After talking to him on and off 
for a year, he paid us 100,000 yuan for the firm.
31 
 
 The differences in access to information about the future earnings potential of the firm 
between the manager/buyer and leader/seller that characterize the buyout of the firm create 
tension when establishing the firm’s purchase price.  Since the manager can withhold the true 
information about the firm’s prospective value when negotiating with the leader, he might always 
be expected to claim that the firm is of a lower value than it really is.  Without any mechanisms to 
                                                                                                                                                 
ownership structure in China's economic transition: an analysis of the rural non-farm sector.” 
31 Township leader interview 12, 7 July 1998. 
  16 reveal the manager’s private information, the government can only accept the low price or choose 
not to privatize at all.  If leaders and managers are unable to overcome the problem caused by the 
uneven access to information, it could lead to no privatization – a lose-lose situation since both 
parties could benefit from the efficiency gains of privatization. 
In such an environment, are leaders always able to overcome the difficulties?  Do the 
variation of premium rates reflect any systematic success for leaders and managers?  Examination 
of the data reveals a strong correlation between the firm’s performance after privatization and the 
premium rate that the manager paid to the leader for the firm (Table 4).  Managers who pay 
higher premiums tend to run firms that perform better after privatization than those who pay 
lower premiums (or who purchased the firm for a discount).  When examining the three different 
types of firms – heavily discounted, moderately discounted, and the premium-paying firms – our 
data show that the postprivatization performance of the premium-paying firms improved more 
than that of the moderately discounted firms.  The performance of heavily discounted firms 
actually deteriorated after privatization.  The accounts receivable management and value added 
per worker of heavily discounted firms performed worse postprivatization than preprivatization.  
Firms having different premium rates also differed in the amount of effort their new 
owners (managers) exerted after privatization (Table 4, column 4).  The data demonstrate that 
managers who paid a premium for their firms exerted more effort in improving their newly 
acquired firm.  Specifically, managers of the premium-paying firms worked 13 hours longer per 
week than managers of the heavily discounted firms (82.5 hours versus 69.8).  
Interviews with new owners also revealed the relationship between effort and the size of 
the premium.  Some managers admitted that they exerted almost no additional effort to improve 
their newly acquired firm’s efficiency.  These, almost invariably, were the ones who bought 
heavily discounted firms.  Others, especially those who paid a high premium for the firm, worked 
much harder after privatization.   
  17 In fact, the differences between the two types of owners can be clearly drawn from our 
interviews with the new owners of two firms in Liuqiao Township (discussed above).  When we 
asked the new owner of the construction materials firm (a heavily-discounted firm) whether there 
was any change to him and to the firm after privatization, he said, “There is not much difference.  
It is largely still the same firm, with the same people.  I really only have a bit more independence 
now.”
32   
The new owners – three brothers – of the electric fan enterprise (a premium-paying firm) 
told a different story.  One of them told us, “Yes, since we bought the firm, we bought new 
equipment and hired more people.  And we do much better now.  We also have greatly increased 
the amount of time that we work.  We now have more plans to expand.”
33   
While the relationship between the size of the premium and the postprivatization 
performance of the firm is clear, the relationship between the two is less so.  From an economic 
point of view, it is difficult to argue that it is the size of the premium or discount that causes the 
differences in performance.  Conventional economic thinking suggests that the amount managers 
pay for their firms are already committed and should not affect ex post behavior since managers 
are residual claimants.  Barring some other difference, the owner of a discounted and premium-
paying firm should act the same.  Rather, it is possible that after acquiring the firm for a discount, 
the incentives faced by the new owners may not have been as strong as those who paid a 
premium.     
The answer, in part, might be that the original owner of one firm, in fact, endows its 
buyer with different sets of rights than those provided by another original owner to its buyer.  In 
addition, it is possible that the nature of the rights depends on the magnitude of the premium rate.  
Such a case would exist if after a firm was privatized (in the sense that it was sold to its former 
manager), the leader who sold off the firm to a buyer for a heavy discount was able to claim part 
                                                 
32 Manager interview 1201, 7 July 1998. 
33 Manager interview 1202, 7 July 1998. 
  18 of the firms’ future profits.  In other words, it could be that some buyout negotiations leave a 
“tail” in the leaders’ hands.
34  In this case the incentive problem is clear.  If the manager has to 
share his profits with the government after privatization, his enthusiasm to expend more effort 
and raise the firm’s efficiency would be lower.  In contrast, better performing firms appear to face 
a different set of incentives.  If leaders promised not to interfere or ask for further payments from 
these firms, and if the rights of these privatized firms are secure, managers would have better 
incentives.   
Perhaps the most important result from our study of privatization is our finding that 
leaders decide to keep a tail in some cases and not in others.  This institutional mechanism plays 
an important role in both facilitating insider privatization and shaping the earnings profiles of 
rural firms in China.  Although it was difficult with traditional survey methods (such as those 
used in our 1998 firm-level survey) to isolate contractual contingencies, during our follow-up 
interviews in 2000 we collected information that supports the idea that leaders in some firms keep 
a tail and those in others do not.  During the follow-up survey, we asked the township leaders the 
following question: Are there privatized firms for which you received only a small buyout price, 
but from which you expect to receive future payments?  Leaders in 15 out of 38 townships 
answered “yes” to this question, a high enough level of response that we consider this to be prima 
facie evidence that such contractual forms do exist.  When examining which firms are required to 
make such payments and which firms have no such liability, we find a strong correlation between 
the postprivatization profit sharing arrangements and the original buyout price.  Our data show 
that for a subset of firms there is a significant negative correlation between the postprivatization 
payment (as a percentage of profit) and the normalized buyout price (-0.39). 
This statistical finding is backed up by conversations we had with many leaders and 
managers.  For example, when we asked one Zhejiang Province township leader to describe the 
                                                 
34 In Chinese, the expression “with a tail” or “leave a tail” suggests that a task has not been completed.  
Specifically, in this paper, it means that privatization does not give the new owner full incentives, since the 
  19 nature of their relationship with the new owners of their township’s privatized firms, he replied, 
“We continue to have a close relationship with some firms and not others.  If the firm makes (has 
made) a lot of profits after privatization, and they got the firm for a low price, we are due a part of 
the profits.”
35 
  When we asked the manager of one of the firms that had such a relationship with the 
government, the firm manager laughed and answered, “Making a lot of profits?  That is not very 
likely to happen, otherwise, I would have paid more.  But, if I did end up making a lot of money, 
I would expect that the government would be owed a part of it and I would probably not mind 
paying the government more.”
36 
 When we also asked a manager of a premium-paying firm the same question, we 
received a different answer.  The manager emphatically said, “No way.  We do not owe them [the 
government] anything else.  We already paid all that they asked us to pay.  The firm is ours, and 
we do not owe anybody anything after paying our taxes.  We made about one million yuan in the 
past three years. No one asked for any additional payments.”
37 
In discovering such a mechanism we can explain several of the special features of 
China’s privatization.  Since some leaders will come back to some firms for a share of future 
profits, but not others, we have one possible explanation of why some firms are becoming more 
efficient after privatization while others are not.  We also believe that having such contingency 
contracts (that is, for a certain type of firm—in our case a discount paying firm—contingent on 
the firm making a profit, the leaders may or may not ask the firm to turn over to the township 
additional payments) are an institutional mechanism that allows China’s leaders to sell firms to 
insiders whereas others have been unsuccessful in doing so.  The leaders use the threat of the tail 
as a “screening mechanism” during the buyout negotiations to elicit information from managers 
                                                                                                                                                 
original owner, the government, retains some residual rights over future profits. 
35 Township leader interview 122, 12 August 1998. 
36 Manager interview 15403, 26 August 1998. 
37 Manager interview 12301, 4 August 1998. 
  20 about the value of the firm.  The screening occurs by the use of joint contingent profit share and 
the buyout price.  The buyout process is one where leaders offer the manager a menu of contracts, 
each one consisting of two key terms: a buyout price and a sharing rule for future profits.  For 
managers who pay a lower premium or have a higher discount (for example the construction 
material firm in Liuqiao Township), the government has the right to share with the new owner 
part of the firm’s postprivatization profits (should they be made).  In contrast, for managers who 
are willing to pay a higher buyout price for the firm (such as the brothers who bought the electric 
fan firm), the government promises to give the firm full rights to all of their future earnings (that 
is, after their official taxes are paid).   
One of the “elegant” elements about this type of screening mechanism is that it is able to 
collect private information from the managers without coercing them.  Good managers will be 
separated from bad ones.  This is because good managers (or managers of good firms) who 
believe that they can make substantial profits after privatization will prefer to pay a higher buyout 
price in order to keep all the firm’s future profits.  Bad managers (or managers of bad firms), in 
contrast, know that they are not likely to earn much postprivatization.  As a result, they will 
choose to pay only a small amount up front.  In return for the lower price, however, the manager 
that purchased the heavily discounted firm knows that he will have to share a part of any profits 
with the government. 
Although this mechanism makes it possible to elicit important information before the 
buyout occurs, there is a cost for the government.  The contract terms accepted by bad managers 
(or managers of firms with poor future prospects) will not face strong incentives.  In this subset of 
cases, the poor incentives will lead to lower effort.  As a result, we should not expect all 
privatized firms to operate more efficiently after privatization; only those better firms with more 
capable managers do.   
  
Successful Insider Privatization in Rural China 
  21 While it is important to understand how many firms have been privatized, and how 
privatization has been executed, policy makers are also concerned about whether or not the 
privatization movement has been successful.  Some researchers in China suspect that the 
government leaders and the insider managers collude to seek rents from privatization.
38  They 
argue that these firms are not becoming more efficient due to the nature of the rent-seeking 
process.  Others argue that even if insiders pay little to buy out the firms, as long as the new 
owners have full incentives, these firms should prosper.
39  In this section, although a complete 
discussion of the efficiency analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, we do provide a summary 
of our empirical work that addresses three sets of questions.  Do firms perform better after 
privatization? If so, what firms perform better? And for those that do, why do they perform 
better? 
To measure the effects of privatization on firm efficiency, we explain performance as a 
function of privatization and other control variables.  We use three performance measures – 
accounts receivable management, the profit rate, and value added per worker – as dependent 
variables.  To explain performance, we include several control variables to measure firm size.  
We use total asset value when we explain accounts receivable behavior and profit rates, and use 
labor and capital when we explain value added per worker.  In order to compare the performance 
of privatized firms to that of government-owned and private firms, and to compare post 
privatization performance to preprivatization performance, we have three ownership indicators: 
private, preprivatization privatized, and postprivatization privatized indicators (the default is 
government-owned firms).  
Our most basic models (i.e., using an Ordinary Least Squares estimator without 
controlling for the size of buyout price) show mixed results of the effect of privatization on 
performance (Table 5).  The firm size measures are significant (rows 1 and 2); larger firms tend to 
                                                 
38 Wen Lu, “Problems during the process of TVE reforms.” 
  22 perform better than smaller firms in terms of profitability and collecting account receivables.  
Also, truly private firms (those that were never government owned) outperform government-
owned firms when examining all performance measures – with 4.6 percentage points fewer 
overdue accounts receivable, profit rates that are 5.4 percentage points higher, and value added 
rates that are 15.2 percentage points higher (row 4).  In this simple model, the improvement in 
performance of privatized firms relative to government-owned firms is less obvious.  Although 
the postprivatization indicator has a positive coefficient in all of the equations, none of them are 
significant (row 6). 
The findings change, however, when we control for the relative size of the buyout price.  
When we include in our model a variable that measures how large a premium the manager paid 
for his firm, we find performance of privatized firms increases significantly with the size of the 
premium (Table 6).  Privatization has a strong positive effect for the premium-paying firms for all 
three performance measures.  Compared with the government-owned firms, premium-paying 
firms have 6.3 percentage points fewer overdue accounts receivable, 5.6 percentage points higher 
profit rate, and a 20 percentage points higher value added per worker (row 6).  However, as the 
premium rate decreases (that is, when we look at privatized firms that enjoyed a moderate 
discount), the relationship between privatization and performance either disappears or reduces.  
Most importantly, according to our analysis, the performance of the heavily discounted firms is 
indistinguishable from that of government-owned firms (row 8). 
There is also evidence showing that premium-paying privatized firms have caught up 
with private firms.  We conduct a series of statistical tests for regression (4)-(6) in order to 
examine whether the performance of privatized firms is catching up with that of private firms or 
whether it remains the same as that of government-owned firms.  We accept the hypothesis that 
the premium-paying firms perform as well as private firms in terms of all three performance 
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“Saving or Stripping Rural Industry: an Analysis of Privatization and Efficiency in China.” 
  23 measures.  This means that accounts receivable management, profit rate, and value added per 
worker of privatized firms whose managers paid a premium, have caught up with those of private 
firms. 
If these effects are typical for firms in rural China, they show, in general, how 
privatization has helped improve firm performance.  We have shown, however, that not all firms 
improve their performance equally.  Firms with a higher premium rate improve performance 
more than those with a lower premium rate, and most likely this is due to the owners in different 
types of firms facing different incentives.  In general, our econometric analysis provides 
supporting evidence to the screening theory. 
 
Conclusions and Implications for the Rural Political Economy 
In this paper, we have described the process of privatizing China’s TEs.  Our work shows 
that the pervasiveness of privatization is apparent.  The privatization in the mid-1990s is deep and 
fundamental.  Almost 90 percent of local government-owned firms have transferred their shares 
to the private sector partially or completely by 1999.  Privatization is widespread, regardless of 
what definition we use (share-shifting, controlling-interest shifting, or complete).   
Our analysis also explains the surprising success of insider privatization.  We 
demonstrate that in the face of information imbalances between the seller and buyer, the buyout 
price and a contractually contingent payment in the form of a claim on future firm profits by 
government leaders can be used to elicit information from the buyer about the firm’s future 
profitability.  Using such a mechanism, leaders can maximize their revenues and prevent 
privatization stalling.  Although some inefficiency arises due to the poorer incentives that some 
managers face, “privatization with a tail” allows leaders to separate good managers from poor 
managers (or strong firms from weak firms) and attain a second-best solution. 
 
  24 Impacts beyond Firm Efficiency.  In China’s countryside, however, privatization involves 
even more complicated issues than its impact on firm efficiency.  Moreover, the nature of these 
other issues is often so intertwined with the performance of firms and operation of the rural 
economy that sometimes it is difficult to disentangle exactly what factors are most important.  For 
example, it is possible that privatization does not only involve providing the new owners with 
better incentives.  In some cases, it also could involve corruption.  In fact, it is difficult to 
distinguish on the basis of data whether it is poor incentives or corruption that causes the poor 
performance of discounted firms.  If leaders were to ask the buyer to pay not only a buyout price, 
but also a payment to the leader’s personal account, the manager might be allowed to purchase 
the firm for a discount.  If there were no chance of being caught, the manager would have full 
incentives for the firm’s future profits.  However, if there was a chance that managers be caught 
and punished for corruption, and if the probability of getting caught was greater the more 
discount the manager received, managers in this case might also face imperfect incentives, since 
they would not want to have such a firm perform too successfully and attract the attention of 
others.  Although we do not have systematic data showing the existence of corruption in the 
privatization process, we do hear stories about corrupted deals.  Both the former party secretary 
and mayor of Xinjian Township in Jinyun County, were removed for corruption, and one of the 
crimes they committed was taking bribes during the privatization process.  The managers who 
bribed were also jailed, and the privatized firms were confiscated by the government, and resold 
to new owners.  To the extent that this situation is widespread, privatization may have adverse 
effects as well as the positive ones that lead to their greater efficiency. 
Beyond corruption, privatization may also affect the fiscal circumstances of local 
governments.  Since one of the major functions of TVEs traditionally was to help finance local 
government budgetary expenditures, one natural concern about privatization is that it may worsen 
  25 local public finances.
40  Revenues could fall if the profit remittances that once came from the 
government-owned firms were not fully replaced by alternative sources.  However, there are 
other factors that may attenuate the budgetary impact of government losing their own firms.  
First, in many cases, by the mid-1990s, TEs had become liabilities rather than assets to local 
governments.
41 Second, although for many private firms the residual rights on profits have shifted 
to the managers, local governments still are able to generate revenues by collecting tax from these 
same firms.
42  Third, when local governments shed themselves of the burden of running their own 
enterprises, their time is freed up and it is possible that they can find other ways to raise local 
revenues.   
Overall, in our sample, we find that privatization has not affected the locality’s fiscal 
conditions.  By examining township fiscal income and expenditures for the four years of our 
sample period 1994-1997, we find that although more firms were privatized each year, 83 percent 
of the townships actually experienced a rise in the budgetary (and extra-budgetary) revenue every 
year.  In a separate paper, we employ multivariate analysis to examine the correlation between 
privatization and local fiscal income.  We actually find that the number and sizes of firms 
privatized has no dampening effect on local public finance.
43  Such findings should also allay 
concerns that the strength of government control would fall when the government lost direct 
control over revenue earning entities.
44  
In conclusion, our results present evidence that rural industries in China may continue to 
contribute to the nation’s economic growth.  Private firms will necessarily be a part of all 
industrial sectors in the future.  The current trends suggest private, rural firms are evolving in a 
positive way that may very likely give them an active role in the coming years.  While more 
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42 Ibid. 
43 Hongbin Li, Scott Rozelle and Li-an Zhou, “Fiscal decentralization and privatization: evidence from 
rural China,” mimeo, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. 
  26 research is needed, we show how the rural industrial sector is responding as in the past to the new 
institutional changes occurring around it.  We cannot say if the gain in efficiency is enough to 
make rural industries competitive in the future.  But at the very least, the change is in the right 
direction.  As such, policy makers who are calling for the suppression of rural industries have no 
basis for their claims.  It may be that additional policy changes could relax constraints that could 
make the gains in efficiency even greater, and rural industry could even re-assume its pivotal role 
in China’s growth and rural employment.  
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Table 1:  Ownership Structure of Industry After Privatization under Alternative Definitions of Privatization 
in Both Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces, 1993-1999. 
 
  

























1993-1999, 390 firms, 43 townships 
 









    Privatized 
 
86 78  57 
 
 
a  Under “Share-Shifting Privatization”, a privatized firm is any township enterprise in 1994 (fully-owned) 
that shifted any part of its shares to private individuals.  Under Controlling-interest Shifting Privatization, a 
privatized firm is any township enterprise in 1994 (fully-owned; those with majority share) that transferred 
enough shares to private individuals to give them a majority share.  Under “Complete Privatization,” a 
privatized firm is any township enterprise (fully-owned; those with majority-share; those with minority-
share) that shifted all of its shares to private owners, and has hence lost all of its ownership interest in the 
firm.   
b  Under share-shifting privatization, a township enterprise includes only those firms with 100 percent 
controlling interests held by the township.  Under controlling-sharing shifting privatization, a township 
enterprise includes all firms in which the township holds a majority of the shares.  Under complete 
privatization, a township enterprise includes all firms with any shares held by the township.  
 
Source: 










































    
0-20 7  16 
21-40 6  14 
41-60 10  23 
61-80 12  28 
81-100 8  19 
    
Total 43  100 
    
 
a The number of townships in each percentage range.  For example, the number 7 in the first row means that 
seven townships have privatized between 0 to 20 percent of their firms between 1993 and 1999. 
b The percentage of townships in each percentage range.  For example, the number 16 in the first row means 
that 16 percent townships have privatized between 0 to 20 percent of their firms. 
 
















Table 3: The Buyout Price, Base Value, and Premium Rate of Privatized Firms in Rural China, 1994-1997. 
(N=88) 
 
Buyout price to 
base value (BB) 
ratio













































            
0-20 21  0.78  7.16  18.06  -6.39  -0.32 
21-50 14  1.48  4.56  11.67  -3.17  -0.29 
51-75 13  1.57  2.39  6.80  -0.82  -0.12 
76-100 13  3.09  3.80  16.61  -0.70  -0.03 
Greater than 100  20  3.24  2.58  10.88  0.93  0.10 
Less than 0
 g 7  0.20  -0.69  6.22  0.89  0.18 
            
 
a The ratio is calculated by dividing column 2 by column 3. 
b The buyout price is the cash paid by the new owner to the government at the time of privatization. 
c The base value is the book value of equity, which is the difference of the book value of assets and the 
book value of debt. 
d The asset value is the book value of assets. 
e The payment premium is the difference between the buyout price and the firm’s base value, or column 5 = 
column 2 - column 3. 
f The premium rate is the ratio of payment premium to the asset value, or column 6 = column 5 /column 4. 




Authors’ 1998 firm-level survey. 










Table 4: Average Performance Measures of Heavily-Discounted, Moderately-Discounted and Premium-Paying 
























        
Heavily-discounted (30 firms)
 f        
     Preprivatization  0.780  0.012  13.63   
     Postprivatization  0.749  0.026  10.33  69.8 
     Improvement
 g  -0.031 0.014 -3.30   
        
Moderately-discounted (26 firms)
 f       
     Preprivatization  0.823  -0.007  9.73   
     Postprivatization  0.846  0.018  13.78  75.4 
     Improvement  0.023 0.025 4.05   
        
Premium-paying (32 firms)
 f        
     Preprivatization  0.796  0.001  9.49   
     Postprivatization  0.833  0.023  12.54  82.5 
     Improvement  0.037 0.022 3.05   
        
 
a This table reports the means of each group of firms for all four years except that the manager's workload is only 
for the year 1997. 
b Accounts receivable management = 1 – overdue accounts receivable / assets. 
c Profit rate = profits / sales 
d Value added per worker = (production value – materials costs)/workers. 
e Manager's workload is the number of hours the manager works per week. 
f Heavily discounted firms are those in which the premium rate is less than -0.2; moderately discounted firms are 
those in which the premium rate is between -0.2 and 0; and premium-paying firms are those in which the 
managers have paid a non-negative premium (the premium rate is positive or zero). 
g Improvement is defined as: postprivatization mean - preprivatization mean. 
 
Source: 
Authors’ 1998 firm-level survey. 
 
 
























Value added per  
worker (log) 
(3) 






Employment (log)      0.102*** 
(0.023) 
Capital labor ratio (log)      0.333*** 
(0.025) 
      






Privatized firms       












      
Province*year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector*year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Observation 572  591  552 
R-squared 0.13  0.14  0.36 
F-statistics 1.76***  2.06***  6.35*** 
      
 
a Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 
percent.  All regressions include interactive terms of province*year and sector*year. 
 
Source: 












Table 6: Ordinary Least Square Regressions Measuring the Effect of the Buyout Price on Performance of 
Privatized Firms in Rural China, 1994-1997
 a 
  






















Employment (log)      0.105*** 
(0.023) 
Capital labor ratio (log)      0.333*** 
(0.025) 
      






Privatized firms       






    Postprivatization   
 
  


















      
Observation 572  591  552 
R-squared 0.15  0.15  0.36 
F-statistics 2.06***  2.13***  6.20*** 
      
 
a Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 
percent.  All regressions include interactive terms of province*year and sector*year. 
 
Source: 
Authors’ 1998 firm-level survey. 





Table A1: Content of Different Surveys 












       
Township leader survey (59 
townships) 
Secretary or mayor 
or vice mayor 
 Local  socio-
economic 
information 
& leader’s human 
capital 
Privatization contracts 
       
       
Fiscal survey  Township fiscal 
office head 




        
        
1998 (larger) Census  














       
       
2000 (smaller) Census  












but only for 390 firms 
       
       
Firm-level survey
 (168 firms = 
47 TE + 88 privatized TE + 33 
private firms)
 a 
Firm manager and 
accountant 
 Complete   
        
 
a Observations of the firm survey was drawn in 1998 from the census of 643 firms that were owned by the 
township government in 1993 and private firms that are of similar size. 
 